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I. E.M.S.
I am sure it woul-d. be in Europets interest to have a European Monetary Systen
consisting of all nine Conmunity countries. But of course the tems must be fair -
every prospective member wilt rigtrtly want to be sure of that - and the system
must be durable. A successful mlIS will help to create the cond.itions of monetary
stability that are essentiaf for the success of sound.ly based. d.omestie grorthpolicies. But to be successfirl the EIrIS must take equal aceormt of the interests
of all prospeetive mem,bers and must be built on firm for:nd.ations.
Ihope f vil-L be abl-e to convince those of you who have serious d.oubts what is
being proposed. and. those who are stiLl trying to nake up their nin6s thatparticipation in a viable EMS is in the interest of aIL the Menber States. NothingI can say will convince the professional anti-Europeans and. those vho in reality
oppose the Governmentfs policy of making the fight against inflation its nainpriority and. vho uill- attack anything that serves to reinforce monetary d.i<iipIines...
The cor:ntries of the Errropean Cornmunity are particularly inter-clependent. fhe UK
senô' 36/" of her total e:rports to other Member States, Ger^nany \6/r-, anô, France 5I%.Moreover, as the UK is more d.epend.ent on externaL trade than Geraar\y, or France,the share of its GDP accounted. for by inports from the rest of the Connunity ishigher. In lgTT the proportion vas lo%, compared. with 9.7% for Gerrnany and
9.2/, lor France.
Thus strict§ on grounds of national self interest every Member State 
- Britain
includ.ed 
- shor:Id. look sympatheticall-y at a proposition, such as H,IS, vhich is
d.esigned. to shield. the cor:ntries of Europe from the vorst effects of the extremefluctuations in exchange rates that have arisen since the breakd.own of the
Bretton Woods system, and. to provid.e a basis for effective coord.ination of
national- economie policies
The need to accompany El4S with appropriate national policies imFlies obligationsfor both veak and. strong eountries. Inevitably these obligations vi1l in one
sense fall- more heavily on the foraer, for the systen wilL only endure if thereis greater convergence than at present betveen the perfornr&nce of the Co""nr:nityrs
nine national- economies and. convergenee should. obviously be towards the standards
of the best and. not vorst. Nor should. the stronger economies have to bear the
cost of otherst ind.iscipline. But of course to aspire to do as veII as the best in
the fight against inflation and in response to their other economic prob1.erns ought
to be the weaker countries I objective anlruay.
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I must stress that participation in E'lS cannot be a substitute for thepolitical d.etemination to carry out the nationaL policies that are need.ed.to achieve these objectives. But the ad.vantage of pursuing ther within thefrnmework of Elits is that this viII give the veaker àcononiàs a greater chanceof securing complementary policies from the stronger countries than wor:ld
othe::wise be obtainable.. . ..
But having looked at ENIS in terms of the Conmunity as a who1e, I vor:Id. alsoIike, since this is a British aud.ienc'e, to point out sme of the consequencesçecifically for Britain of refusing to participate in a viable system.Unfortr:nately it seems r:nIikely that these *oul-d. be restricted. to the non-
enjoyment of the benefits of joining. it is important not to be apocalyptic,but there is a real danger that if Britain rejects or appears to rèjeet-Éusin principle rather than because the d.etairs àr trre speôific scheme on offer
are seriously inad.eqr:ate then she vilL not merely niss a great opportr:nity,but vi1l also substantially exacerbate her present nationat diffiôu1ties.
First, because such a stanee couLd all too easily be interpreted at home and
abroad' as an ind.ication of r:nrrillingness on the part of the Governmentgenuinely to get to grips with Britain's econoniË problems. Since, as f havesaid, menbership of a properly organised EIvIS woulcl require the goverrment todo no more than to pursue the policies vhich are necessary an1nrày, foreigninvestors, cu.rrency narket d.ea1ers, and. d.omestic management and. ôrganiseàlabor:r night veLl- assr:me that voluntary non-membership imFlied that the
Sovernment l-acked the necessary resolve - and they vould. act accord.ingly.Proving that it has this resolve night veII prove hard.er outsid.e EIvIS tha^n in.
Second., because Britaints abil-ity tô influence major d.ecisions which profor:nùLy
affect her nor:Id. be red.uced.. As I enphasised. at the outset, BritaintÀ econony'is now intinately l-inked. with its partners. But if m,ls d,oes not includ.e aII
nine Member States, decisions concerning its management wi11 have to be taken
outside the fra^mework of the Coumunityrs institutions. fhis coul-d. we1l meanthat Britain wor:Ld. have no effective say in how her partners manage their
respective currencies either in relation to each other or in relation to
currencies outsid.e the system, inclucling sterling.
Non participation might also d.ininish Britainrs capacity to make her views feltin other areas of Connunity policy. It is frankly d.ifficult to assess the
extent and. seale of this risk. Comnunity Ievel d.ecisions outside the sphere
of B{S woul-d. continue to be taken within the Comunity fra.mework. This meansthat Britain vor:ld enjoy the sa.me Iega1 rights and. saieguard.s concerning them
as at present. But in ny viev there can be IittIe d.oubt that her unwiliingnessto undertake obligations which others had accepted. voulcl in practice
substantially reduce the readiness of her partners to 1isten to Britainrs views
about issues such as the need, to refor"m the CAP and. to tackle the probleu ofperverse resource f1ows.
0f course EMS may fai1, and. then those who have stayed. out will look quite
cl-ever. But the fail-ure will d.o nobodlr arly good.. Success on the other hand.
could. bring great economic advantages. I must however stress yet again that tobe successfr:I the scheme must take account of the interests of aLI nine
Member States and. be both durabLe and. sor:nd.§ based.
o
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II. Financial Services
It is not d.ifficult to see that a cormon market, in not just banking but
financial services generally, would benefit from a European monetary system
which over a period. of tine resulted in the lowering of exchange control
barriers and. freer flovs of capital across frontiers. It is equally the
ease honever that as the Connr:nity moves tonards a freer monetary regime,
it will become not merely d.esirable, but necessary to aceompany it with the
necessary prud.ential- nechanisms some of vhich I sha11 d.iscuss later in
this speech. At the sa.me tiue the Conmissionrs aim is to try to avoid. the
creation of yet another Coumunity institution - say a European Prud.ential
Cornmission sinee ve believe that this is not necessary. What hovever
will be necessary is the closest possible cooperation between supervisory
authorities. Such cooperation has afready begun: the Conmission aims to
foster it still further so that as the Conror:nity moves toward.s monetary
union, governments, supervisors, the inclustry and. the public can have the
confid.ence that the secr:rity of the system appropriately matehes its
growing freed.om.
An a^mbitious aim you may say. But it is not nev. The Treaty of Rome
provid.es for freedom of financial service. Yet, tventy years after the
Conmunityr s creation, progress toward.s freed.om in financial services lags
far behind. the freedom achieved. in comparable areas such as tracle in good.s,
and. relative ease of movement of people vithin the Comr:nity. But vhen one
stops to think, it shoultl be no more d.iffieult for banks or insurance
companies to set up networks of branehes throughout the Comunity than for
industrial undertakings to become established. throughout the Comr:nity or
people more fulfy.....
1. Why coordination? Wtrlr is this necessary?
First, the banks and. insurance companies in all- the Merober States are
becoming increasing§ internationaL in scope. ÏIere supervisory authorities
to rernain restricted. to exercising control only within their national
bor:nd.aries, nany operations woul-d. escape their view altogether. 0n a large
scal-e this becomes und.esirable. As financial institutions become inter-
nationaf so therefore supervisory authorities must follow their lead.. This
in turn means that national supervisory authorities must cooperate which
inplies the creation, over a period. of time, of a cornmon supervisory policy,
i.e. comparabl-e means of exercising supenision. This coorclination must be
achieved, through a combination of continuous close consultation between
supervisory authorities and, d.irectives harmonising essential aspects of the
Iaw.
The second. reason for coordination d.erives from the interest of those super-
vised,. The creation of an enlarged. narket, a Connunity in which borclers
d.isappear or are at any rate ,easily crossed., an economic area mnde up of the
territories of nine States and. in which centralised. d.irection, integrated.
book-keeping and. unifozrr cash management become feasiblel offers banks and
insurance conpanies the opportunity to achieve consid.erable rationalisation
of their existing operations as weLl as the chance to expa.nd. As I an
speaking in Britain I shoutd like at this point to say a particular word.
about British fina^ncial- institutions. They have a strong export record.
which has bror:ght great benefit to this cor:ntry. This achievement shorrld. be
recognised.. At the sa,me time it is right to acknovled.ge that continental
Europe has not alvays been at the centre of their attention and. has not
historically been the area of greatest concentration of effort. But the
pattern of UK trad.e flows is changing and financial services cannot and
should. not ignore the implications of this shift. I a:n confid.ent they wiIL
not and. I trust in the future, as the mnrket for financial senrices opens
up they will regard. this "single" market, as it is cal1ed in Corlr r:nity jargon
as part of the domestic market that it will have become.
.../
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The third re&son is the benefits to be d.erived. by customers. These are
particularly clear in the insurance fie1d. ÏIe want to ereate a situation
vhere initially large inclustrial firus - and then later a1l- other sections of
the rnarket taking out insurance - can select fron the insurers offering the
best terms in the entire Cornmr:nity. Bringing about free competition in an
enlarged 
'nerket - an atlditional ain - also requires coordination since such
coropetition can take place on fair terzs only if the d.ifferent practices of
the various supervisory authorities clo not lead. to d.istortion of competition
and, if those insured. enjoy equivalent protection, no matter vhere they take
out their insurance
2. Method. of coordination
This can be èone through 15s 'inFlementation of two vell-knovn Comr.rnity
principles 
- 
rrfreedon of establishment" and t'freedom to provide services". I'Ie
intend. to create an enlarged open market for cred.it institutions, insura.nce
und.ertakings, investment companies and. stock exchange dealers. We intend to
remove the obstacles presented. by flontiers and. to introduce rules and
regr:lations only where these are necessary to ensure fair competition and.
investor protection. ÏJe are therefore basically concerned to satisfÿ a clemand.:
the d.emand. from European financial- institutions for sinplified procedr:res
and broader opportr:nities. l{e will only introcluce Connr:nity legislation
vhere national lavs have brorrght about complex and inward-looking systens which
must be opened up and. d.ovetailed. into a Corrmwrity systen
3. Coordination of banking law
After initial§ - and unsuccessfully-atte-Fting a conprehensive and. far-reaching
harmonisation of lavsrthe Comission switched in 19?3 (ttre year of the aecession
of the United. Kingdon, Derunark and lreland) to a more pragmatic approach. The
aim is to integrate banking systems grad.ually over a periocl of several years-..
To this end, the Conmission subnitted in 19?\ tfre first general proposal for a
directive - the First Coordination Directive - vhich merely outlined, the basicprinciples of a har-monised, banking law.. . . .
It represents the first step in our plans to harmonise banking 1aw by stages.
In particular it contains provisions on the licensing procedure for ereclit
institutions, and. a1l the Member States must either introd.uce correslrcnding
rules or adapt them where they a.lrea(y exist. The main licensing conclitions are
the requirement that conpanies must have sufficient capital (the ]eve1 and
eonposition of which is, however, not êefined. in d.etail), ed requirements
concerning proper nanagement, and IegaI fonr and. similar eriteria. The new
banking lav planned. in the UK, as proposed in the l{trite Paper of Jr:ly 1978, has
alread5r ad.opted the requirements in the Directive, so the Comr:nity Directive
should pose no real problems for the Unitecl Kingd.oro.
Unfortunate§ the Directive says little about freedom to set up bra^nches any-
where in the Connunity. Our aim is that und.ertakings which have obtained
authorisation in one of the Member States shor:J-d. be free to establish branches
vithout further authorisation in all the other States. fhe Direetive I am
discussing makes it only slightly easier to establish branches in other Member
States and on this point clearly shows the need for firther eoordination.
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The se.me is true of continuous supervision of cred.it institutions. Our first
Directive merely adheres to the principle that cred.it institutions shoul-d. be
supervised. on the basis of solvency and. liquid.ity criteria; the d.etail-s are
left open and are to be d,etermined. through cooperation betveen the super-
visory authorities. Our principle is nevertheLess clear: lre wish to achieve
a system in vhich banks operating throughout Europe remain, wherever they are
vorking, und.er the superrrision of their nationaf authorities and subject to
home-country rules
This brings me to the question of the next steps in our vork in the banking
sector. !{e have tlra'rn up a work progra,nme vhich for the ti-me being is still
an internal Cormission working clocr-ment, and.'we are consulting all the
governments on it. I am in the process of a tour of all the Nine capitals;
in a monthrs ti:ne the top Member Statesr officials responsible for banking will
meet in Brussels, iu ord.er to discuss the future work progranrme and its
priorities.....
)+. European Insurance Law
Here the Cor',mission's general approach has been very similar to that in banking:
the insurance sector, to a greater extent than banking is one where the
legislation route is appropriate. fhe Connission has however only mad.e
proposats after extensive consultation of both the ind,ustry ancl goverr:nent
authorities concerned. . .. . .
Let me now turn to ind.ernnity insuranee. Freedom of establishment here has been
largely achieved. A Directive published as early as 1973 harmonises the
fund.amental-s of the system of supenrision and. thus makes it easier for insurance
und.ertakings to set up in several EEC countries at the sa.me time. Harmonisation
in particular also covers the fi:nd.a.menta1 financial- ru-l-es, especially the
nininr:n requirenents for the size of ind.ividual companies own capital. The
great step which has still to be taken is that of the freed.om to provide
services. Insurance undertakings from one EEC State must be able to sell their
policies across frontiers, even if tney have set up no estabfishments in the
Itlember States concerned.
I'Ie want to extend. the freed.om to provid.e services in the insurance sector in
general. In the first instance ve must however confine ourselves to major
risks such as transport or suretyship risks for exa.mpIe, or to especially large
fire insurance policies. Especially large or specifically comercial contracts
of this kind vithout exeeption involve the participation of insurers vho can
themselves assess the security and adequacy of the guarantees offered.
The conplete freed.om to provid.e services vhich vould. also enable the man in
the street to insure hinself abroacl against sickness costs for example or
private fire danage, wouId. require the harmonisation of the l-avs on insurance
contracts as veII as other changes. fhe first steps tovarcls measures of this
kind are now at the discussion stage in the Conrmission. A degree of
approxi$ation of the basic aspects of insurance contract lan is inportant for
internationaf cover of raajor risks. We need for instanee to agree broaùLy on
insurance contract payment obligations or rights relating to termination and
so on. When it comes to the "smaII" policy hoId,er, such points viI1 have to
be settled. in detail. But for the stage we have so far reached., that of big
risks, it is sufficient to stipuLate a few general provisions and, alIov the
parties concerned. to choose the law they vant the contract drawn in.......
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In eoncl-usion T should like to deal brief§ with the problerns of life
assurance. Here our efforts are still at the stage of the freeclm of
establishment, that is we are vorking on the approximation of l-aws which
should nake it easier for life assurers to open branches in other Member
States in order to offer their serrrices in the host country. Here coordination
is nainly concernecl with own capital requirements. The aim is for a l-ife
assurance company in an EEC cor:ntry other than its own to be able to submit a
certificate from its national authorities stating that it possesses
sufficient solvency in the cor:ntry in vhich its heacl office is situated. It
vould. then not have to raise nev eapital in the host cor:ntry: this vould.
represent a substantial liberalisation but this cannot become flrJ.ly effective
until- the nany adclitional requirements, for exanple those on the valuation
of assets, have been nad.e subject to comparable rules.
One of the rnajor problens we come up against in this connection is the
d.iffering structr:re of insurance und.ertakings. Sonetimes these rurd.ertakings
are ttspecialisedtt and. soneti-mes ttcompositett insurers, i.e. in sone countries
und.ertakings can hand.le several or all branches of insr:rance at the sane time,
vhile in other countries the law requires then to specialise in certain
branches, in particular life assr:rance. This naturally nakes the integration
d.ifficr:It. But this is precisely the point on which a eompromise put fo:nrard
by the United Kingd.ondeJqgation is in sight. fhe British Government vould be
willing to accept the folloving sitrration: insurance compa.nies which are
newly established wor:-l-d. have to specialise in all the Menber States.
However, eomposite insurers which already exist now (such as the insurance
companies in the United. Kingdon and Belgiun), can continue to operate as
all-prrpose und.ertalrings. But if they move to a country where specialisation
is conpulsory, they nust comply vith this requireuent by creeting a separete
activity for each of the two areas - an ind.epend.ent subsid.iary for the life
assurance business and a separate branch for inclennity insurance. The
Cornmission regard.s this conpromise proposal as lrery constructive and supports
it in the hope that it will provide the basis for the Cor:ncilfs early
ad.option of the life assurance directive
